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A Problematic of the Political Norm for the "Internal Enlargement" of the European Union

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A PROBLEMATIC OF THE POLITICAL NORM FOR THE
“INTERNAL ENLARGEMENT” OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

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Abstract

The regional governments of Catalonia and Scotland have argued that they would be able to remove their region from their respective host state and gain automatic entry to the European Union. This is what is known in academia as an “internal enlargement” of the European Union. This dissertation will argue, firstly, that advocacy on behalf of the feasibility of an “internal enlargement” can be considered an example of “normative entrepreneurship” and could have potentially far - reaching effects for European integration. Secondly, this dissertation will attempt to delineate some of the areas of this emerging “political norm” which can be regarded as problematic for the pursuit of European integration as a means of forwarding a political agenda that favours the creation of a European *demos* and truly representative European institutions.

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Introduction

Mass political movements advocating self – determination in Catalonia and Scotland are nothing new in either region – read Balcells (1996) or Smith (2014) for an overview of Catalan nationalism, and Harvie (1994) or Devine (2012) for Scotland. What is unusual about these movements in their most recent incarnations is *how* they operate within the paradigm change the European Union has brought to bear on international relations.

Theorists of “Europeanisation”, an analytical concept that political scientists have used to refer to the effects of European integration on politics, have been pointing out since the mid – 1970s that the EU has re – written the legal relationships between European individuals, European governments and international organisations in potentially unprecedented ways (Zaborowski, 2004; Landrech, 2010; Börzel & Panke, 2013; Pollack, 2015). Combined with the unique history of the European Union, an organisation which emerged with the purpose of preventing another war on the European continent (Hewitson & D'Auria, 2012; Phinnemore, 2013; Urwin, 2013), there have emerged areas of political contention where greater ethico – normative clarity is required (Weiler, 2012; Walker, 2017).

This dissertation is concerned with one of those areas of contention: the possibility of an “internal enlargement” of the European Union *via* a referendum on self – determination in Catalonia or Scotland. It is written from the perspective of someone who sees an “internal enlargement” as problematic because, should such a move be endorsed by the institutions of the European Union and its Member States, it would create more problems for the bloc than it would solve. As of 2017, the *Guardian* newspaper had documented a total of 21 regions in the European Union, including Catalonia and Scotland, that are seeking independence (Henley et al. 2017). None of those regions, because of the democratic nature of their host

state, would be entitled to secession under international law (Weiler, 2012; Walker, 2017), and the institutions of the European Union already face more independent states than they are designed to handle (Lewis, 2013). The EU would be endorsing a trend toward regional ego – centrism and fragmentation at a time in which its multiple existential crises demand a greater level of solidarity between the “peoples” of Europe.

My interest with this dissertation is to call attention to “areas” of the proposed “internal enlargement” that are problematic, as a means of advancing a political agenda for the creation of a pan – European *demos*. It has been over fifteen years now since German philosopher Jürgen Habermas called for a European constitution (Habermas, 2001), and, since then, a collection of diverse intellectuals and entities, gathered in the Democracy in Europe Movement (DiEM25) have been advocates for the creation of truly representative European institutions as the best development possible for European integration (DiEM25, 2018). If the proponents of a “Catalonia in Europe” or a “Scotland in Europe” are as concerned with democracy as they claim to be (Salmond, 2014; Romeva, 2015) then they should be capitalizing on the democratic impetus that their politics have created (Cramer, 2015; Convery & Harvey, 2015) and pushing for a more ambitious version of European integration in which all Europeans, regardless of the economic wealth of their region of origin, are able to influence the EU policy – making process.

Plan of the study

The plan of this dissertation is as follows. In Chapter Two, I will argue that nationalist politicians in Catalonia and Scotland have sought to construct a new political “norm” of “internal enlargement”, and that their advocacy should concern us because of its

transformative potential for European integration. Chapter Three will be a short literature review of legal scholarship on “internal enlargement”, with the purpose of providing some clarity for the discussion ahead. In Chapter Four, I will briefly introduce the methodology I have used in the dissertation – the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) developed by Riesigl & Wodak (2014) – provide a brief rationale for my selection of sources, and outline how I will approach each source for analysis.

In Chapters Five through Nine, I will examine examples of political discourse related to “internal enlargement”, taken from high – profile politicians in Catalonia and Scotland. I will outline the discursive strategies these politicians have used to “sell” “internal enlargement” to the public, and then proceed to problematize one aspect of their “sales pitch”, ranging from the compatibility of “grievance – based nationalism” with the European Union to the argument that an “internal enlargement” will be “easy”. The motivating research questions of this dissertation are thus: a) Can we say that the Catalan *Generalitat* and the Scottish government have sought to produce a political norm of “internal enlargement”? and b) If so, what aspects of this norm can be said to be problematic? Chapter Ten will be devoted to the conclusion.

“Who is the political self” asks Joseph Weiler in his essay on Catalonia “that has the right to determine whether or not the historical nation...will be broken up?” (Weiler, 2012, pg. 911). Inspired by Weiler, we could ask a similar question when debating the cases of European regions such as Catalonia and Scotland: Who is the (European) political self that would be created through an “internal enlargement”? The answer to this question, as we shall see, is much more complex than is readily apparent.

Chapter Two: Normative entrepreneurship in Catalonia and Scotland

– A new political norm for “internal enlargement”

What is “internal enlargement”?

“Internal enlargement” is the idea that a region from a EU Member State could secede from that Member State without leaving the institutions of the European Union entirely (Closa, 2017; Piris, 2017). As such, it is fundamentally different from an *external enlargement* of the EU, a process which requires that sovereign states such as Albania or Turkey apply for membership of the bloc from the outside *via* Article 49 of the Treaty of the European Union. Art. 49 (1) reads:

“Any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 (primarily respect for democracy and the rule of law) and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union”

(TEU, 1992, cited in EUR-lex, 2007, *text in parentheses added for clarification*)

Following Art. 49 TEU, applicants to the EU must implement an extensive list of policies in their own states, related to democracy, respect for human rights and market economics (European Commission, 2016). They must also commit to adherence to the aim of ever greater “political, economic and monetary union” in conjunction with the rest of the EU Member States (European Commission, 2016, para. 5). The European Commission will assess the completion of these requirements by potential candidates, and, if satisfied, the European Council will agree to begin negotiations on accession (European External Action Service, 2016).

Both the Catalan *Generalitat* and the Scottish Government have argued that their regions could, theoretically, continue to enjoy the full benefits derived from EU membership – barring *formal* political representation in Brussels – after a peaceful, democratic vote to secede the United Kingdom or Spain (Scottish Government, 2013; Bossacoma, 2017). In such a scenario, they would be remaining (incomplete) *de iure* members of the Union during a transitional period until they could become *de facto* Member States (Scottish Government, 2013; Bossacoma, 2017). This is what is known as the internal enlargement of the European Union.

A political norm for “internal enlargement”

In political science, a norm or rule is defined as “a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1989, pg. 891). Norms, write March & Olsen (2008, pg. 693) “prescribe, more or less precisely, what is appropriate action”.

The defining feature of a political norm lies its quality of *oughtness* (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1989; March & Olsen, 2008): it is a moral argument that is expected to guide the actions of (political) actor(s) in a given (political) situation. We can hear strong echoes of *oughtness* in the arguments of pro – independence politicians such as Raül Romeva for Catalonia or Alex Salmond for Scotland. Consider the following quotes:

“What I’m saying – is that it’s possible, it’s perfectly possible, that one part of a Member State becomes a new state in the European Union. In the EU Treaties, you do not find any point, any article, where you *expulse* anyone”

(Romeva, 2015, 9:17 – 9:54, *emphasis in original*)

“Now, the decision (of whether to allow an “internal enlargement” to take place) is one for Member States. But not to recognise the democratic will of Scotland would run counter to the entire European Union ideal of democratic expression and inclusion. It would pose a challenge to the integrity of the European Union *even* greater and more fundamental than the threat of British withdrawal”

(Salmond, 2014, 9:23 – 9:42, *text in parentheses added for clarification*)

These quotes were taken from discussions on “ internal enlargement”: the quote from Mr. Romeva is from a 2015 interview on BBC Hard Talk, while the one from Mr. Salmond is from a speech he gave in Aberdeen in 2014. Both men were clearly making normative arguments when they spoke: “internal enlargement” will take place because we are *entitled* to remain in Europe, or because our process of secession has been fundamentally *democratic*.

However, one can remain skeptical of Romeva or Salmond’s claims. The Catalan *Generalitat* and the Scottish Government may be using normative arguments, one may think, but this does not make them *de facto* “normative entrepreneurs”.

My argument in favor of viewing the promotion of “internal enlargement” as “normative entrepreneurship” is three – fold. Political scientists such as Hopkin (2016) have argued that the primary drive for secession in rich European regions such as Catalonia, Scotland, Bavaria or Flanders is not emancipatory but *developmental*. However, even when dealing with a subject as dry as economics, moral contentions are inescapable: indeed, there is a field of ethics called *distributive justice* that deals *primarily* with the ethical dimension(s) of economics (Tan, 2010). For example, it is undisputed that a region such as Catalonia, a net contributor to Spain, would be leaving the rest of Spain worse off were it to become an

independent state (Bel, 2015; Cotarelo, 2016), and this raises important questions of economic re – distribution. Political proposals that represent a particular understanding of “right” and “wrong” are inherently a form of “normative entrepreneurship”.

Secondly, the legal approach that the *Generalitat* and the SNP have proposed for “internal enlargement” has been buttressed by a range of experts drawing on well – developed ethico – normative arguments (Matas i Dalmases et al. 2011; Edward, 2012; Avery, 2012; Ridao & González Bondía, 2014). These arguments are drawn from traditions such as distributive justice, democratic theory, political philosophy, normative theory and European integration studies, and deserve respect as free – standing normative arguments in their own right.

Finally, the unique nature of the European Union, which derives a great part of its strength as an inter – governmental organisation from its normative character (Kenealy, 2014), means that an “internal enlargement” could acquire great *normative* strength should it ever be endorsed by the EU. How could the Union keep a straight face when telling a region such as Flanders or the Basque Country that the same “standard of appropriateness” it accepted in the event of Catalan or Scottish independence would not apply to the quest for statehood of other EU regions?

The transformative potential of “internal enlargement”

I have argued above that Catalonia and Scotland are engaging in “normative entrepreneurship” through the promotion of an “internal enlargement” of the EU. But what difference should such an abstract eventuality make to the layman? Shouldn’t he be more

concerned with the situation of human rights in Spain (Amnesty International, 2017) or with ensuring that a (possible) secession is carried out in a fair and democratic way?

Most seasoned observers of EU politics would agree that an “internal enlargement” would represent the culmination of two normative developments that have been brewing for some time now: the increased salience of *regionalist* politics in the EU and the emergence of a “Primary Choice” theory of secession. An instance of “internal enlargement” would be a turning point in European history and could encourage an avalanche of secessions of a similar breadth (but not, hopefully, genocidal consequences) of that which followed the fall of the Hapsburg Dynasty or the collapse of the Ottoman Empire (Hobsbawm, 1993).

Toward a “Europe of the Regions”?

The first “significant normative development” that was alluded to is the increased salience of *regionalism* in the European Union (Loughlin, 1996; Luedtke, 2005).

A *region* is defined in political science as “a level of government and/or administration...found between the central state and the province, department or country” (Loughlin, 1996, pg. 146). *Regionalism* “refers to an ideology and a political movement advocating greater control by regions over their political, economic, and social affairs” (Loughlin, 1996, pg. 148).

The “regional question” has appeared periodically in the history of European integration (Loughlin, 1996), but the current salience of *regionalism* dates to the 1980s and owes its importance to the de – centralizing momentum unleashed by globalisation (Luedtke,

2005). The establishment of the European Regional Development Fund in 1975 and the Committee of the Regions, a consultative EU institution, in 1994, represented watershed moments for *regionalist* politicians such as former *President* of the *Generalitat* Jordi Pujol, (Loughlin, 1996), although it was the inclusion of the principle of *subsidiarity* – the idea that social and political issues are managed most effectively at a local level – in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 which cemented the status of EU regions as an indispensable element of EU governance (Hooghe & Marks, 2001).

The success of *regionalist* politicians in the European Union has generated much of the momentum that is carrying advocacy for “internal enlargement”. The political entities which now advocate “internal enlargement”, such as the (now defunct) *Convergència i Unió* party or *Esquerra Republicana Catalana* (ERC), were previously passionate advocates of greater independence for European regions *within* current institutional structures (Giordano & Roller, 2002) under the slogan of “a Europe of the Regions”. Their radicalization may have been born from their realisation that the levels of autonomy they had previously hoped to achieve “within the system” were politically untenable.

A Primary Choice Theory of Secession

The second “significant normative development” which was referred to above is the emergence of the “Primary Choice” theory of secession (Buchanan, 2017; Walker, 2017). The two main theories of secession – Remedial Right and Primary Choice or Primary Right – will be addressed more fully during the literature review. Suffice it to say for now that most international lawyers would not recognize the right of Catalonia or Scotland to become an independent state, because these two regions do not fulfil the basic requirements of

international law orthodoxy: a) that the “people” in question demanding statehood be repressed, or b) that the “people” demanding statehood find themselves in a situation of colonisation (Walker, 2017).

Nevertheless, this orthodoxy has been challenged in recent years by a conceptualization of a *right to secession as the right of a national minority to be “taken seriously”* (Walker, 2017, pg. 38). According to Buchanan (2017, para. 15) “Primary Right Theories...contend that the right to secede can exist even when the group has not been subjected to any injustice”. This view of secession has been seized upon by international lawyers sympathetic to the “plight” of the people of Catalonia and Scotland (Matas i Dalmases et. al. 2011; Ridao & González Bondía, 2014) and has become an article of faith for opportunistic politicians (Weiler, 2012). While “Primary Choice” advocates may proceed from different regions of the world, their advocacy has generated normative arguments that can be used in advocacy of internal enlargement as well (Scottish Government, 2013; Bossacoma, 2017). If the Catalans or Scots have a right to be “taken seriously” in their host states, why not in Europe as well?


Of norms and normative cascades

In their seminal work on norms in international relations, Finnemore & Sikkink, (1998) develop a concept known as the “life – cycle of norms”. This “life – cycle” has three stages: an initial stage of “norm emergence”, in which normative entrepreneurs develop a new norm and attempt to convince a critical mass of states to adopt their new norm; a second stage called the “normative cascade”, taking place after the critical mass of states is reached, at which point a large number of states – perhaps the majority – begin to adopt the new norm;

and a final stage of “norm internalization” where the norm has become so common – place in international relations that it has acquired a “taken – for – granted quality” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998).

Using the concept of the “life – cycle of norms”, I have attempted to conceptualize below how an EU endorsement of “internal enlargement” could (potentially) become a turning point for both regionalists and advocates of “Primary Choice” theory secession:

Figure 1: How “internal enlargement” could (potentially) change European international relations in three stages



Conclusion

My hope is that the above diagram is self – explanatory. We currently find ourselves at the first stage of the conceptualization. If we were ever to reach the second stage *via* an EU endorsement of “internal enlargement”, international law orthodoxy would be dealt a serious blow. EU regions would then become more powerful overnight, as they would be able to

hang the spectre of secession over the head of their host states should they disagree with any of its policies. But once we arrived at the second stage, it is difficult to see why the process should stop there. With the two main deterrents for European secessionists – the possibility of non – recognition of their new state and exclusion from the Single Market – removed *via* the creation of an “internal enlargement precedent”, we could witness a cascade of additional “internal enlargements” within months.

Some may see a more atomized European Union as desirable. Bossacoma (2017) in particular argues that allowing a greater fragmentation of the EU would make European integration easier because smaller states could not put up as much resistance to this process. However, with greater diversity comes a greater variety of (national) interests, and it does not proceed that a Union that struggles to coordinate policy between 27 Member States (Balmer, et al., 2018) should find it easier when more join the club. For these reasons “internal enlargement” is important and it is for these same reasons that it is best to begin to critique it now, before a dramatic enlargement of the EU becomes an inevitability.

Chapter Three: Literature Review of “Internal Enlargement”

Most of what has been written on the topic of “internal enlargement” is legal scholarship. Given this situation, I will use the literature review section to provide answers to some legal issues surrounding “internal enlargement”, and to argue that my dissertation is relevant to existing literature on “internal enlargement” because it discusses important issues at the intersection of politics and law.

What does international law say about a secession in Europe?

As I mentioned in Chapter Two, before joining the EU as an independent state, Catalonia or Scotland would first have to *become* independent states. In contemporary international relations, this would be no easy task, because international law takes a very strict view of secession (Buchanan, 2017; Piris, 2017; Medina Ortega, 2017; Walker, 2017).

Under the “Remedial Right” theory, which currently dominates the international law orthodoxy, secession is only justified “if some basic injustice is present and uncorrected” in the relationship between the central state and the region that wants to leave (Walker, 2017, pg. 38). These “basic injustices” are generally understood to mean a) political repression or b) colonization (Buchanan, 2017; Walker, 2017), neither of which are believed to be fulfilled in Catalonia or Scotland at this point in time (Weiler, 2012).

Nevertheless, this “Remedial Right” theory of secession has been criticised for being too strict and challenged by an emerging “Primary Choice” or “Primary Right” theory of secession (Buchanan, 2017; Walker, 2017). There are two intellectual variants of the

“Primary Choice” theory, “Ascriptivist” and “Plebiscitarian”, with the intentions of the Euro – nationalists falling squarely into the “Plebiscitarian” school of thought (Buchanan, 2017). According to Plebiscitarian “Primary Choice” theorists, a self – identified peoples only need meet two requirements to secede from their host state: a majority in a (democratically organized) referendum on self – determination, and the fulfillment of a “State Viability Requirement” or “State Viability Proviso”: that is, the proof that the emerging state would be a viable one in that it would be able to perform all the functions expected of it (Buchanan, 2017).

Would an independent European state that emerged via a referendum be recognised by other states?

This is a key question, because a state cannot (in practice) function as a state unless it is recognised by other states (Lauterpacht, 1944; Worster, 2009), and a non – state cannot join the European Union (European Commission, 2016). In this regard, statehood is similar to a monopoly: new states are entirely dependent on established ones for recognition (Worster, 2009). The 1993 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, which is considered to be *the* authoritative document on statehood (Worster, 2009) states:

“The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.”

(The Governments represented in the Seventh International Conference of American States, 1993, Art. 1)

An independent state that emerged from an EU Member State, most likely being Catalonia or Scotland, would undoubtedly meet all of the Montevideo criteria (Weiler, 2012). But then again, there are several entities that meet the *legal* requirements of statehood – Kosovo being a case in point – and are not recognised by their peers due to *political reasons*, while there remain entities that do not meet all the requirements of the Montevideo Convention – the Vatican does not possess a “permanent population”, Israel does not possess a “defined territory” – but are recognised as states by their peers (Worster, 2009).

The key difference between failure or success for Euro – nationalists rests between a hypothetical *declaration* of independence and a subsequent *recognition* of their independent state, a period during which they will have to lobby other governments for recognition with no guarantee of success. Ridao & González Bondía (2014) argue that the international community has treated recent instances of secession in Eastern Europe and the Balkans quite favorably, although due to the very different socio – political circumstances in those regions, it is far from clear that the resolution of those conflicts can provide any clues for expectant Catalans or Scots. The outcome of a successful secession in contemporary Western Europe remains shrouded in mystery.

How do Catalan and Scottish nationalists propose to achieve an “internal enlargement”?

Both the *Generalitat* and the Scottish Government have proposed that, once a majority of their “peoples” endorses independence in a democratic referendum, their new nation should receive immediate recognition from the EU as an independent state (BBC Scotland, 2013; Salmond, 2014; Romeva, 2015), and they would proceed to “re – write” the relationship of their region with the European Union through Article 48 of the TEU, the

article that provides for the amendment of the EU Treaties (Scottish Government, 2013; Bossacoma, 2017). In effect, what they are proposing is the legalization of “internal enlargement” through the creation of a new pathway to EU membership. Art. 48 (2) TEU reads:

“The Government of any Member State, the European Parliament or the Commission may submit to the Council proposals for the amendment of the Treaties. These proposals may, inter alia, serve either to increase or to reduce the competences conferred on the Union in the Treaties. These proposals shall be submitted to the European Council by the Council and the national Parliaments shall be notified.”

(TEU, 1992, cited in EUR-lex, 2012a)

The Scottish Government, which is the entity that has come the closest to achieving “independence in Europe” has suggested that a “transitional period” of 18 months would be sufficient to re – negotiate Scotland’s membership of the EU “from within” (Owen, 2014), during which, as mentioned at the beginning of Chapter Two, Scotland would continue to enjoy all the benefits derived from full EU membership barring political representation (Scottish Government, 2013). This proposal was seconded by lawyers sympathetic to Scottish independence (Avery, 2012; Edward, 2012). In academia, the idea of an “internal enlargement” through Art. 48 has also been met with some support (Matas i Dalmases et. al. 2011; Kenealy, 2014).

In addition to these proposals, Ridao & González Bondía (2014) have argued that, should an EU region ever become an un – recognised independent state, it *could* still remain within the Treaties of the EU and the EU Single Market until it obtained formal recognition. There is a precedent for this: the citizens of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

(TRNC), which is only recognised as sovereign by Turkey, became EU citizens when Cyprus joined the European Union in 2004 (Ridao & González Bondía, 2014). This is because the *de facto* partition of Cyprus in 1974 has never been *de iure* recognised by the international community, and international treaties that are ratified by the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) take legal effect across the entire island (Ridao & González Bondía, 2014). Nevertheless, the TRNC has no political representation within the European Union (Ridao & González Bondía, 2014).

What does the European Union say about “internal enlargement”?

The European Commission, which is responsible with up – holding the Treaties of the European Union, has gone out of its way to challenge the position of the governments in Catalonia and Scotland on “internal enlargement” (Barroso, 2012a; Barroso, 2012b; European Commission, 2017a; Reuters, 2017). In his correspondence with the British House of Lords, Former EU Commissioner Barroso (2012a, pg. 1) argued that:

“If part of the territory of a Member State would cease to be part of that state because it were to become a new independent state, the Treaties would no longer apply to that territory. In other words, a new independent state would, by the fact of its independence, become a third country with respect to the EU and the Treaties would no longer apply on its territory.”

The other EU institution that has pronounced itself on “internal enlargement” is the Committee of the Regions, the EU organ that is tasked with connecting the regions of the European Union to Brussels. In point 63 of its Draft Report, the Committee agreed that:

“if a region, having achieved independence, wanted to join the EU, it would be required to make a formal application to the Council and to follow the accession procedure under Article 49 TEU in the same way as any other country that wished to become an EU Member State”

(Committee of the Regions, 2013, point 63)

The case for “internal enlargement” has not yet been brought before the European Court of Justice, the EU institution that has the final say on matters pertaining to the Union. Governments of EU Member States such as Spain have been adamant that “internal enlargement” not take place (Murray, 2012; The Scotsman, 2014), although advocates of “internal enlargement” have suggested that these Member States would change their minds, once a vote to become independent had crystallized and they came to terms with the economic dislocation that removing the region in question from the European Union would cause them (BBC Scotland, 2013; Salmond, 2014; Romeva, 2015).

Is there such a thing as European citizenship, and can it shield Catalans or Scots from being removed from the Union?

A common argument by proponents of “internal enlargement” is that “their people” are entitled to remain in the European Union because they already hold European citizenship. This argument was expressed by Catalan pro – independence campaigner Raül Romeva in 2015:

“One thing is a territory, the other thing is a people. I mean, I’m a Spanish national right now, and as a Spanish national I have the European citizenship. You cannot expulse 7.5 (million) people out of the European Union”

(Romeva, 2015, 11:22 – 11: 34)

This argument was articulated in a legal form by a group of Catalan constitutional scholars, who argued that, because it is the aspiration of the European Union to become a federation, citizenship of the EU should be treated as the a right of those who currently posses it:

“Effectively, the individuals unique status in the European Union, especially following the Maastricht Treaty, is defined by the concept of citizenship, understood as a legal and political bond between the Union and individuals”

(Matas i Dalmases et. al. 2011, pg. 27)

While many (the author included) find the emergence of a United States of Europe or of a pan – European *demos* desirable, it is a fallacy to claim that we have arrived at that stage. Possession of European citizenship is *additional to*, not *independent of*, citizenship of an EU Member State. Art. 20 (1) of the Treaty for the Functioning of the European Union clearly states:

“Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship.”

(TFEU, 2007, cited in EUR-lex, 2012b)

Furthermore, it is (conceptually) misleading to invoke the canard of EU citizenship when advocating for an internal enlargement of the European Union, as Matas i Dalmases et. al. (2011) have done, because proposals for an “internal enlargement” have much more in common with aspirations for a “Europe of the Regions” than they do with aspirations for a “Europe of the Citizens”. If the possession of a free – standing European citizenship is the

salient feature of membership of the European Union, why are advocates of “internal enlargement” so concerned with fragmenting the EU into nationalities?

Is there a precedent for internal enlargement of the EU?

There is no *legal* or *political* precedent for internal enlargement of the EU. We have already examined the case of Cyprus put forth by Ridao & González Bondía (2014), which, while not a precedent for what “internal enlargement” aspires to, may provide us with a possible road – map.

Bossacoma (2017) has suggested that the case of German re – unification may provide us with possible clues as well. According to Bossacoma (2017), the merging of the Democratic Republic of Germany (DRG) and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 could be considered a case of “internal enlargement” of the EU in the sense that the FRG – an EU member state – absorbed the DRG – a non-EU member state – without the need for an accession process. The decision to allow the DRG to join the Union was approved overnight by the Council of the European Union in 1990 (Bossacoma, 2017). Blair Jenkins, the chief executive of the “Yes Scotland” campaign, was of the same mind:

“An example to look at (referring to a possible precedent of internal enlargement) is East Germany. East Germany when it re – united with West Germany joined the European Union overnight. Now that was on the basis of 40 years of Communist dictatorship... I think if a territory the size of East Germany can overnight become part of the EU, then the notion that Scotland... would find itself in a more difficult position than that is absurd”

(Jenkins, 2012, cited in BBC News, 2012, 4:37 – 5:08, *text in parentheses added for clarification*)

Similar to the examples of Eastern Europe and the Balkans, it is important to keep in mind that the re – unification of Germany took place under very different socio – political circumstances to the ones currently enjoyed by the EU regions in Western Europe. The clues this case can offer us with regards to the current “theaters” of “internal enlargement” are therefore not readily apparent.

What can a problematic of “internal enlargement” offer legal scholarship on “internal enlargement”?

Scholars of the law have a limited framework when it comes to assessing the moral implications of legal arguments. By outlining areas of the proposed “internal enlargement” which can be considered problematic, we can enable a discussion of issues which are not readily visible or accessible to experts of the law, whether it be constitutional, European or international. For example, from the perspective of legal scholarship, the legal argument made by Matas i Dalmases et. al. (2011) that EU citizens are entitled to EU citizenship regardless of their national affiliation is just one more tool in the “legal tool – kit” of advocates of an “internal enlargement”.

Approached from a normative perspective, however, the issue acquires a different hue. If the distinctive feature of the European Union is that it is an emerging federation, then there are several pathways that can be used to address the grievances of Catalans and Scots. These regions can leave the Union and attempt to re – enter as independent states. They can expend energy on convincing the EU establishment that an “internal enlargement” should be allowed for. Or they can work to deepen European integration from where they currently are, striving to make the European Union fairer, simpler and more representative. Perspectives

like these are what a problematic of a “political norm” of “internal enlargement” can contribute to legal research.

Chapter Four: Methodology, sources and plan of action

In this chapter I will briefly I will also briefly address my selection of sources and provide an outline for the following chapters. I will also introduce the methodology – the Discourse Historical Approach or DHA – and some analytical concepts – discourse, rhetoric, *enthymemes* and *topoi* – that that I will be using in the main section of the dissertation.

Why have I chosen to problematize “internal enlargement” through political discourse and not through some other medium?

I believe that the discursive strategies that politicians use when advocating a particular action – particularly the ones surrounding the creation of *political arguments* – inherently possess the greatest potential for problematization, because it is at the level of discursive strategies that we can best detect the presence of fallacies, contradictions, conflation and mis – representations. In addition to this, each piece of discourse I selected came from an authoritative figure within the Catalan or Scottish nationalist camp, which I hope will lend my problematic some weight in terms of generalizing the findings presented here. Below is an overview of the following five chapters:

Table 1: Sources and problematic

Chapter	Main interlocutor	Means used to deliver discourse	Area of problematic
Five	Carles Puigdemont, former <i>President of the Generalitat</i>	Address at Parliament	Entitlement to EU Membership on basis of history

Six	Nicola Sturgeon, current First Minister of Scotland	Speech	Compatibility of grievance – based nationalism with EU ideals
Seven	Blair Jenkins, former CEO of the “Yes Scotland” Campaign	Interview	Associations of “internal enlargement” with the Enlightenment
Eight	Raül Romeva, former head of defunct “ <i>Junts Pel Si</i> ” electoral coalition	Interview	Claims that “internal enlargement” will be easy
Nine	Alex Salmond, former First Minister of Scotland	Speech	“Internal enlargement” and democracy

In addition, I provide a brief description of the methodology and the analytical concepts that will be used in these chapters below.

Discourse and political discourse

Discourse is defined as a “verbal interchange of ideas” (Merriam - Webster, 2018) or as “a formal discussion of a topic” (Oxford Dictionaries, 2018a). As such, it is a different concept from political rhetoric, which is defined as “the art of effective or persuasive speaking or writing” (Oxford Dictionaries, 2018b), although both terms can be used interchangeably. When looking at the arguments that proponents of “internal enlargement” have made, I have sometimes found it helpful to reduce them to the structure of an *enthymemes* in order to better examine what is being said.

Figure 2: Example of a syllogism

Premise One (Objective Statement): All fish have gills

Premise Two (Objective Statement): No mammals have gills

Conclusion: Therefore, a whale cannot be a fish

Figure 3: *Enthymeme*

Premise One (Objective Statement): Spain has a democratic responsibility to Catalonia

Premise Two (Subjective Statement): Spain has neglected Catalonia


Conclusion: Therefore, Catalonia should seek assistance from entities outside of Spain

(information on syllogisms and *enthymemes* comes from Arnhart, 1981)

The Discourse Historical Approach

The Discourse Historical Approach or DHA is a methodology developed by Riesigl & Wodak (2014) for the analysis of political discourse within the field of Critical Discourse Analysis. As the main impetus of my dissertation is *critical* – I seek to problematize “internal enlargement” – this choice seemed more appropriate than a methodology in the more conventional field of Discourse Studies. There is a graphic outline of the DHA below:

Figure 4: Levels of Analysis in the Discourse Historical Approach



(from Boukala & Wodak, 2015, pg. 93)

Table 2: Discursive Strategies recognised by the Discourse Historical Approach

Discursive Strategy	Objectives	Example
Nomination	Discursive construction of social actors/objects/phenomena/events and processes/actions.	<i>"The Scottish people"</i>
Predication	Discursive qualification of social actors, objects, phenomena, events/ processes and actions (more or less positively or negatively)	<i>"After a vote for Scottish independence, the EU will greatly desire for Scotland to remain part of the Union"</i>
Argumentation	Justification and questioning of claims to truth and normative rightness	<i>"You cannot remove the Catalan region from the European Union because there is no article in the Treaties that covers for the secession of a region"</i>
Perspectivization	Positioning speaker's or writer's point of view and expressing involvement or distance	<i>"The central issue that concerns us is democracy"</i>
Intensification/ Mitigation	Modifying (intensifying or mitigating) the illocutionary force and thus the epistemic or deontic force of utterings.	<i>"The 1st of October referendum was an exceptional moment of historical dimensions"</i>

(from Reisigl & Wodak, 2014, pg. 94)

I have de – constructed each sample of discourse using the DHA, paying particular attention to the discursive strategy of (political) *argumentation* which is recurring in discussions of “internal enlargement”. I have also found the concept of *topos*, a dialectical scheme which reflects the “commonsense knowledge” (*endoxa* in the Aristotelian tradition) that orators hold (Charteris - Black, 2014; Boukala & Wodak, 2015), quite illuminating when conducting my analysis. Below are some examples of common *topos* that political orators can use:

Table 3: Common *topos* (from Boukala & Wodak, 2015, pg. 96)

Topos	Example
Topos of opposites	“If war causes us all this damage, then we should make peace”
Topos of definition	“If someone believes that evil is related to the Gods, then he believes in the existence of Gods”
Topos of syllogism that starts with the specific and concludes with the general	“If some human beings do not trust their property to a specific group of people, then they cannot entrust their salvation to that same group of people”

Structure of following chapters

In each chapter, I will provide an opening paragraph of context for the text under analysis. I will then provide a discussion of the discursive strategies and arguments featured in the context of the DHA methodology, and select one feature that I feel is problematic to discuss in a final section. The expectation is that keeping with this structure enables me to

examine these samples of discourse in a systematic way in order to generate data for the conclusion.

Chapter Five: Carles Puigdemont appears before the Catalan

Parlament, 2017

Context

After the turbulent scene described in Chapter One, acting Catalan *President* Carles Puigdemont appeared before the Catalan *Parlament* to, in his own words, “present the results of the referendum...and explain its political consequences” (Puigdemont, 2017c, para. 1). While Puigdemont doesn’t mention “internal enlargement” explicitly in his speech, I have selected it because it provides an excellent overview of the perceived political situation which, in the eyes of the nationalist – run *Generalitat*, would justify the unilateral declaration of independence of Catalonia from Spain, expected to trigger the first instance of “internal enlargement”

Overview

Puigdemont begins his speech stressing the exceptionality of the moment – using a discursive strategy of *intensification*, according to the DHA – before linking this exceptionality to Europe by making the argument– using an *argumentation* strategy in the DHA tradition – what has transpired – the *Generalitat* sponsored referendum on self – determination, and subsequent police violence – is inextricably linked to Europe:

“We live in an *exceptional* moment, of *historical* dimensions. Its consequences and effects go much farther than our country and *it has become evident that*, far from being a domestic and internal affair as we have often been told by those who have neglected their responsibility in understanding what was going on, Catalonia is a *European affair*”

(Puigdemont, 2017, para. 2, *emphasis added*)

Throughout the speech, Puigdemont makes an argument about Spain which could be expressed in the following syllogism:

Enthymeme 1 (Puigdemont)

Premise One (Objective): Spain has a democratic responsibility to look after Catalonia

Premise Two (Subjective): Spain has neglected Catalonia

Conclusion: Therefore, the situation in Catalonia should concern those outside of Spain

Puigdemont uses most of his speech to outline the grievances of the Catalan people against the Spanish state as a means of justifying the *exceptionality* of the political situation –

a region hosted within a democratic state, poised to make a unilateral declaration of independence. This could be considered part of an *argumentation* strategy, in that the entire speech is an attempt by Puigdemont to justify the situation in which the nationalist – run *Generalitat* finds itself.

“Catalonia believed that the Spanish Constitution of 1978 could be an appropriate starting point to guarantee its self – government and its material progress”

(Puigdemont, 2017 para. 13)

“The passing of the years, however has allowed us to confirm that...the hegemonic elites of the state understand it (referring to the 1978 Spanish Constitution, which does not allow for a referendum on self – determination in Catalonia), not as a starting point (for democracy in Spain), but as an ending point”

(Puigdemont, 2017, para. 14, *text in parentheses added for clarification*)

“The Spanish political system...has activated a systemic and aggressive program of re – centralization”

(Puigdemont, 2017, para. 19)

“This (referring to the police violence of the 1st of October, 2017) has been the answer of the Spanish state to Catalan demands”

(Puigdemont, 2017, para. 25, *text in parentheses added for clarification*)

I will end by noting Puigdemont's remarkably consistent identification of Catalonia with Europe, using both *nominative* and *argumentative* discursive strategies. He does so up to four times in his speech:

"It is the first time in the history of European democracies that a poll has taken place in the midst of police violence"

(Puigdemont, 2017, para. 7)

"Catalonia was thoroughly involved in the operation of returning the Spanish state to European and international institutions after 40 years of autarky and isolation"

(Puigdemont, 2017, para. 13)

"There is a prayer for dialogue that is running across Europe, because Europe already feels apprehensive about the effects of a bad resolution of this conflict"

(Puigdemont, 2017, para. 35)

"To the European Union, I demand that you involve yourself thoroughly and that you look after the foundational values of the Union"

(Puigdemont, 2017, para. 37)

*Problematic: “Internal enlargement” cannot take place on the basis of
historical ties to Europe*

Identification with Europe has been a consistent feature of both Catalan and Scottish nationalism since the appearance of nationalism in these territories in the late 18th century (Balcells, 1996; Harvie, 1994; Devine, 2012; Smith, 2014), and one hears echoes of this in Puigdemont’s speech. Even though Spain and the United Kingdom have historically been perceived as peripheral to (meta – geographical) Europe (Fletcher, 1992; Abulafia, 2015), proponents of “internal enlargement”, such as former *President* of the *Generalitat* Jordi Pujol or Scottish historian Sir Tom Devine, have gone to great pains to stress the special European character of their regions:

“Especially, in contrast to those that, from the beginning, contributed in the greatest amount to the creation of Spain...Catalonia was born as a Carolingian March...which should be considered as the Europe of that historical period”

(Pujol, 1991, para. 2)

“If you take mainland Britain, then Scotland has long been the less insular part...Scotland’s linkage with Europe has been longer than its link with the Commonwealth, the Empire or with England”

(Devine, 2017, cited in McDonald, 2017, paras. 7 – 9)

The possibilities inherent in this line of reasoning are evident: if we have always been a part of Europe, then we should not be asked to leave the EU.

EU membership being open to any country “in Europe”, however (European Commission, 2016), means that there are currently five (nominal) candidate countries (Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey) and two (nominal) potential candidates (Bosnia – Herzegovina and Kosovo) working their way through the conventional accession procedures as per Art. 49 TEU (Official Website of the EU, 2018). Some of them, such as Albania or Serbia, are relatively poor nations have been waiting to become EU members for over a decade (Official Website of the EU, 2018). If wealthy regions in Western Europe feel so strongly about independence, should not they consider leaving the Union for a time to join and joining the accession queue as Commissioner Barroso has suggested (BBC News, 2012b)? Identification with Europe is one of the areas of “internal enlargement” that can be said to be problematic.

Chapter Six: Nicola Sturgeon calls for a second referendum on Scottish independence, 2017

Context

The aftermath of the “Brexit” vote in June 2016 led to renewed calls for a second referendum in Edinburgh. On the 13th of March 2017, two days before the British Prime Minister triggered Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, the Scottish First Minister gave a speech in Edinburgh calling for a second poll on independence. I have selected Sturgeon’s speech because, like Puigdemont’s, it showcases many of the perceived issues that have led Scottish nationalists have used to call for “independence within Europe”.

Overview

Like Puigdemont, Sturgeon dedicates most of her speech to outlining the unaddressed grievances of the Scottish people to justify her call for a second referendum (*argumentation*). As we have seen with the former *President*, Sturgeon begins her speech by using *intensificatory* illocutionary strategies that illustrate what, based on her reading of the post – Brexit political landscape, is a truly exceptional situation:

“Right now, Scotland stands at a hugely important crossroads”

(Sturgeon, 2017, para. 3)

“We didn’t choose to be in this position”

(Sturgeon, 2017, para. 4)

“In common with most people across the country, I wish that we weren’t”

(Sturgeon, 2017, para. 7)

“As a result of the Brexit vote we face a future, not just outside the EU, but also outside the world’s biggest single market”

(Sturgeon, 2017, para. 8)

“All of this has massive implications for Scotland (*referring to the “Brexit” vote*)”

(Sturgeon, 2017, para. 13, *text in parentheses added for clarification*)

Notice how Sturgeon says, “in common with most people across the country, I wish we weren’t” (Sturgeon, 2017, para. 7). It is a well-known fact that a majority of the British public voted for “Brexit” (BBC News, 2014a). Sturgeon here is subtly using a discursive strategy of *nomination* by discursively constructing the Scottish people as an entity distinct from the English. The subtle uses of *nomination* are frequent throughout her speech. It is clear throughout the speech that Brexit is viewed as an imposition on Scotland, and the (perceived) negative consequences of Brexit are often identified with England. For example:

“Some predict that the Tories (the British Conservative party, which in the post – war era has been concentrated in England) could be in power now at Westminster until 2030 or beyond”

(Sturgeon, 2017, para. 8, *text in parentheses added for clarification*)

The British state is described (*predication* in the DHA) as an intransigent and difficult political actor. Its actions have placed the future of the people of Scotland in jeopardy (Sturgeon, 2017).

“Since last June, my focus has been on trying to find an agreement with the UK government that would reconcile the UK wide vote to leave with the Scottish vote to remain”

(Sturgeon, 2017, para. 23)

“But today as we stand, for all we know, on the eve of Article 50 being triggered, not only is there no UK – wide agreement on the way ahead – but the UK government has not moved even an inch in pursuit of compromise and agreement”

(Sturgeon, 2017, para. 30)

“Our efforts at compromise have been met with a brick wall of intransigence”

(Sturgeon, 2017, para. 31)

“UK membership of the single market was ruled out with no prior consultation with the Scottish Government or with other devolved administrations – leaving us facing not just Brexit, but a hard Brexit”

(Sturgeon, 2017, para. 32)

“There has been talk of special deals for the car industry and others, but a point-blank refusal to discuss in any meaningful way a differential approach for Scotland”

(Sturgeon, 2017, para. 33)

Finally, it is worth noting that Sturgeon, like Puigdemont, identifies Scotland’s future with Europe throughout her speech. This could be considered part of an argument (*argumentation*) that she and other SNP – related figures (BBC Scotland, 2013; Salmond, 2014) have made about the desirability of an independent Scotland in Europe.

“In short, it is not just our relationship with Europe that is at stake (referring to the potential effects of “Brexit”)

(Sturgeon, 2017, para. 17, *text in parentheses added for clarification*)

“What is at stake is the kind of country we will become”

(Sturgeon, 2017, para. 18)

Problematic: Is grievance – based nationalism compatible with the ideals of the European Union?

I would like to start this short section by modifying Nicola Sturgeon’s statement slightly: when contemplating “internal enlargement”, what is at stake is the kind of Europe we will become. The re – trenchment toward the “Europe of the Regions” that was envisioned by regionalists (Loughlin, 1996), while well intentioned, may make it more difficult for us to achieve a genuine European *demos* and a “Europe of the Citizens”, if only because the kind of nationalism espoused by Puigdemont and Sturgeon has a poor track record of conceiving for distributive justice beyond national boundaries (Weiler, 2012). But suppose we allow for an independent Catalonia or Scotland to become an EU Member State using the “fast – track” accession procedure envisioned by many (Scottish Government, 2013; Bossacoma, 2017). Should grievance – based nationalism have a place in the European Union?

The answer to this question would most likely be negative. In their masterful study of the intellectual origins of the European Union, Hewitson & D'Auria (2012) argue that the defining feature of the “European idea” was the urgency with which European elites sought to put history behind them. Keeping in mind that the process of European integration moves in fits and starts (the “Empty Chair” crisis of 1965 being a case in point) the European Union owes its current form to the efforts of European elites to reach past their respective grievances to each other (Urwin, 2013). Walter Hallstein, the first President of the EU Commission, had fought for the Nazis (European Commission, 2017b), while Konrad Adenauer, the first Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, had been their political prisoner (European Commission, 2017c), but this did not impede both men from working tirelessly to create the of

the European Coal and Steel Community, a precursor institution to the European Union (European Commission, 2017b; European Commission, 2017c).

Any parallels between the post – war years and today’s EU regions should be contentious. People living on the European continent today have different concerns than they did in 1945 and the nature of European regional relations is has been fundamentally transformed (Berezin, 2009; Hopkin, 2016; Judis, 2016; Kriesi & Pappas, 2016). Berezin (2009) goes as far as arguing that nationalism cannot pose a threat to Europe today because nationalist politics have become *self – contained*. However, it is apparent that the lessons of the founding fathers that one can control one’s relationship to history (European Commission, 2017b; European Commission, 2017c) have been undoubtedly lost on today’s generation of “Euro – nationalists”, who present a secession based on historical wrongs as something inevitable and inescapable (Puigdemont, 2017; Sturgeon, 2017). That the push for “internal enlargement” of the EU is driven by grievance – based nationalism is one aspect of this phenomena I find problematic.

Chapter Seven: Blair Jenkins appears on BBC Scotland Webcast in 2013

Context

On the 18th of January 2013, the BBC's Douglas Fraser interviewed Blair Jenkins, chief executive of the "Yes Scotland" independence campaign and put to him a series of independence – related questions that had been sent to BBC Scotland by viewers. The interview took place three months after the Edinburgh Agreement and with the campaigns for the "Yes" and "No" votes already in full swing. This is the first source in this dissertation that contains discourse dealing explicitly with "internal enlargement". I have selected it because it provides an overview of some of the arguments that Scottish nationalists would use in favour of "internal enlargement" and because, as head of the "Yes Scotland" campaign, Mr. Jenkins statements on "internal enlargement" are authoritative.

Overview

Jenkins begins making arguments (*argumentation*) about “internal enlargement” early on in the interview, after Fraser asks him a question regarding Scotland’s currency plans, post – independence:

“Jenkins: Well, we know as a matter of fact that Scotland cannot be compelled to join the Euro once we are an independent country, we will continue membership of the European Union from a position of being *within* the European Union, terms and conditions of membership will have to be negotiated...”

(Jenkins, 2013, cited in BBC Scotland, 2013, 5:20 – 5:33)

Fraser immediately confronts him on his argument about continued EU membership, demanding greater clarity, to which Jenkins replies citing the opinion of Sir David Edward (2012), a Scottish lawyer and academic who is supportive of Scottish independence.

“Jenkins: At the point when we vote ‘Yes’, legally, *in good faith*, the European Union, at that point, has to begin negotiations with Scotland on the terms and conditions of Scotland’s continuing membership”

(Jenkins, 2013, cited in BBC Scotland, 2013, 5:54 – 6:06, *emphasis in original*).

The sentence “in good faith” originates from Art. 31 (1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, considered part of customary international law, which states that:

“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose”

(VCLT, 1980, cited in Edward, 2012, para. 2)

and it is misleading to mention it in relation to potential negotiations on “internal enlargement”, unless Mr. Jenkins is suggesting that the “ordinary meaning” of the Treaties of the European Union was to allow for new states to join the bloc without having to apply for membership.

However, when Fraser pushes his interviewee for solid evidence to back up this claim, Jenkins switches tack and begins to argue that “internal enlargement” is ultimately a political decision:

“Jenkins: Well, the important point which David Edward makes is this is not a legal decision, it *will not* be a legal decision. There is nothing in the European treaties that covers the scenario that we’re looking at here”

(Jenkins, 2013, cited in BBC Scotland, 2013, 8:06 – 6:06, *emphasis in original*).

The interview is at its most valuable for this dissertation when Jenkins begins to make arguments (*argumentation*) regarding why Member States would allow an “internal enlargement” to take place. Consider the following arguments:

“If you think about the fundamental narrative of the “NO” campaign, it is this assumption that the rest of the world will want to make life difficult for a newly independent Scotland, that we would

be emerging into a hostile environment where people behave *irrationally* towards us. The truth is, the rest of Europe will be very keen to have Scotland as a member of the European Union ”

(Jenkins, 2013, cited in BBC Scotland, 2013, 6:32 – 6:39, *emphasis in the original*)

“There is every reason to suspect that the institutions of the European Union – and indeed the rest of the UK, once Scotland votes to be independent – will act in *enlightened self – interest* ”

(Jenkins, 2013, cited in BBC Scotland, 2013, 9:22 – 9:31, *emphasis added*)

“A mature democracy like Scotland, which has been in continued membership of the European Union and complying with all the terms and conditions for over 40 years...I mean, we look like a *gold plated member* of the European Union – *why on Earth* would they not wish us to be members?”

(Jenkins, 2013, cited in BBC Scotland, 2013, 9:48 – 10:02, *emphasis in the original*)

Jenkins is making two arguments (*argumentation*) here about the *political* situation that would result if a majority of Scots voted to secede the UK in a referendum on self – determination. I note that in the fifth minute of the interview Jenkins implied certainty when he stated that Scotland would “continue membership of the European Union from a position of being *within* the European Union” (Jenkins, 2013, cited in BBC Scotland, 2013, 5:25 – 5:30), casting a suspicious light on the arguments he made later on. Nevertheless, I will examine the arguments he makes in turn.

The first argument about “internal enlargement” that Jenkins makes could be called the *enlightened self – interest* or *rationality* argument:

Enthymeme 1 (Jenkins)

Premise One (Objective statement): The European Union is a self – interested organisation

Premise Two (Subjective statement): Continued Scottish membership will provide many benefits to the European Union

Conclusion: Therefore, Scotland will remain in continued membership

By making this argument, Jenkins could also be said to be using a topos of *rationality*, with the *endoxa* or “reputable opinion” being: *when faced with an existential challenge, all parties involved must act rationally* (i.e. in a utility – maximising manner). Jenkins’ second argument could be called an *absence of wrong – doing* argument:

Enthymeme 2 (Jenkins)

Premise One (Objective statement): One must follow the terms and conditions of the European Union to continue in membership

Premise Two (Subjective statement): Scotland will continue to follow the terms and conditions of the European Union

Conclusion: Therefore, Scotland will remain in continued membership

Depending on what perspective one takes, this argument could be considered to be fallacious: Scotland would not be breaking any “hard” law in the event of an “internal enlargement”, but the Committee of the Regions has pronounced itself against this possibility (Committee of the Regions, 2013).

Problematic: Associations of “internal enlargement” with the Enlightenment

Many of the words that Mr. Jenkins employs in his discourse – rationality, enlightened self – interest, democracy – also refer to concepts that originated in the period of European history known as the Enlightenment. The philosophical legacy of the Enlightenment, particularly a utilitarian reading of European international relations, features heavily in the Romeva interview, which is examined in Chapter Eight:

“The European Union is a very pragmatic project. And I’ve seen, *thousands of times* that a situation that seems to be a problem, an unsolvable problem, then, you suddenly *get up* and find a solution”

(Romeva, 2015, 12:48 – 12:59, *emphasis in original*)

The policy proposals of the *Generalitat* and the Scottish Government are also described using Enlightenment concepts. For example, in his report on “internal enlargement” for the *Generalitat*, Bossacoma (2017) argues that an independent “Catalonia in Europe” would inherently be a champion of free trade:

“Small states have a greater interest in free commerce and the free movement of capital than larger states. Small states have a greater dependency on imports, and, because they cannot affect the prices of the global market, their optimal tariffs tend to be zero”

(Bossacoma, 2017, pg. 36)

We can trace a direct conceptual line between Bossacoma’s *language* and the work of Scottish Enlightenment political economist and philosopher Adam Smith (Smith, 2012).

As the Enlightenment is a historical period that is remembered warmly and in high regard, the implications of this association are apparent: “internal enlargement” is possible, progressive, civilized. However, should we try to trace a conceptual line between the concrete *political proposals* of Catalan and Scottish nationalists and the Enlightenment, we would find greater difficulties. The insistence on achieving formal statehood for these regions, despite their already impressive levels of self – government, would probably have the most in common with the political thought of Johann Gottfried Herder, a German Enlightenment thinker who viewed the nation – state as the paragon of human virtue that all stateless peoples should aspire to (Herder, 1999). In his *Letters for the Advancement of Humanity*, Herder wrote of stateless peoples:

“If a people does not respect itself, how can others respect it, and in turn be respected by it? Only a nation with the will and strength to defend itself, and a constitution suited to the times, is a true nation”

(Herder, 1999, pp. 211 – 212)

Herder’s relationship with the Enlightenment was complex, as his ideas conflicted with the dominant tendency at the time to perceive human improvement as (potentially) unlimited, and his political thought cannot therefore be considered to be representative of those times (Williams, 1999). The (emerging) federation of states that advocates of “internal enlargement” aspire to be a part of does share some of its features with the vision of Immanuel Kant (Kant, 1999), a more representative Enlightenment thinker; but the political proposals of “Euro – nationalists” may be perceived to jar with Kant’s *ethos* because of their insistence that the Union should give them preferential treatment *vis-à-vis* other candidate states (Scottish Government, 2013; Bossacoma, 2017). Isn’t one of the core tenets of the Enlightenment a belief in equality? The connections that advocates of “internal enlargement”

have sought to construct between their policy proposals and the Enlightenment are one of the areas that I find problematic.

Chapter Eight: Raül Romeva is interviewed on BBC Hard Talk, 2015

Context

In September of 2015, Raül Romeva, who was then the head of the *Junts pel Si* pro – independence coalition in the Catalan regional parliament, agreed to appear on the BBC program “Hard Talk” to discuss his career and his objectives. Similar to the Jenkins piece, I have selected this interview because much of the conversation was centered on Europe and on the suggestions of Catalan nationalists, such as Romeva, that an “internal enlargement” of the EU was possible and desirable. Romeva was speaking with the authority of a senior political figure within the Catalan push for “independence in Europe”.

Statements regarding “internal enlargement”

The host of the show begins by questioning the importance of the push for secession from Spain in Catalonia:

“Host: I’m sure you would agree that right now, Europe faces massive challenges on a continental scale, and yet here you sit, a man seemingly obsessed with a *local, parochial* issue..”

“Romeva: What I am obsessed about - what we are obsessed about – is democracy”

(Romeva, 2015, 0:55 – 1:20)

Right from the outset, Romeva *frames (perspectivization in the DHA)* the issue under discussion – the push for secession in Catalonia, which in 2015 had not yet acquired the status of a full – blown territorial crisis – in terms of the exercise of democracy. The exercise of democracy is certainly an issue in Spain, with its contentious treatment of protesters (Amnesty International, 2017) and its asymmetric federated constitution (Börzel, 2002), but it is a falsehood to claim that the main issue the *Junts pel Si* coalition is concerned about is not the national self – determination for Catalonia. Self – determination, as we witnessed in the late 20th century struggles of de – colonization in Southeast Asia (Hobsbawm, 1993; Anderson, 2006), is not inextricably bound up with democracy.

When asked about the rule of law in Spain shortly afterwards and whether it would not be more democratic to respect the ruling of the Spanish Constitutional Court regarding a referendum on secession from Spain in Catalonia, Romeva argues (*argumentation*) that the rule of law and the exercise of the democratic rights of individuals/collectives should go hand

in hand in a EU member state, implying that this is not the case in contemporary Spain (Romeva, 2015). This argument could be expressed in the following syllogism:

Enthymeme 1 (Romeva)

Premise One: The rule of law and democracy should go hand in hand in EU member states

Premise Two: Spain has failed to live up to this ideal

Conclusion: Therefore, it has become acceptable for Catalan nationalists to disobey the law

It is contentious whether this syllogism would constitute a true syllogism, where both of the premises are true, or an *enthymeme*, in which one of the premises – Spain has not acted in line with EU norms – is subjective. With regard to Catalonia, Spain has always acted in accordance with its 1978 Constitution (Cotarelo, 2018), which was considered democratic at the time of Spain’s accession to the EU in 1985, and the position of the EU Commission is that territorial disputes are internal matters for Member States to resolve (European Commission, 2017a). However, reputable human rights watchdogs such as Amnesty International have expressed their concern about the situations of democracy in Spain (Amnesty International, 2017).

The show host then challenges Romeva on his past statements about Europe during his career as a politician:

“Host: Why haven’t you and the other leaders of your campaign been honest with the people about the implications of secession/independence for Catalonia’s place in the European Union?”

(Romeva, 2015, 8:57 – 9:09)

Romeva refutes the charges of misleading voters and proceeds to make a series of arguments (*argumentation*) in favor of the “internal enlargement” of the EU. At two points during the interview he makes a *negative* legal argument when he states that an independent Catalonia could, theoretically, be entitled to EU membership because there is no provision in the EU Treaties that forbids it.

“Romeva: What I’m saying – is that its possible, its perfectly possible, that one part of a member state becomes a new state in the European Union. In the EU Treaties, you do not find any point, any article, where you *expulse* anyone”

(Romeva, 2015, 9:17 – 9:54, *emphasis in original*)

“Romeva: In practical terms, it is not written anywhere that if the Catalonia would become an independent state, it would be expelled from the EU, legally speaking”

(Romeva, 2015, 12:38 – 12:44)

This negative legal argument, which was not included in the literature review because of its simplicity, has practically become an article of faith for certain individuals that have become invested in the prospect of an “internal enlargement”. “What article of the European Union” declared a defiant former President of the *Generalitat*, Artur Más, in 2015 “allows for the expulsion of 7.5 million European citizens? Have you ever spoken with Mr. Cameron (referring to the former British Prime Minister) or Mrs. Merkel (referring to the current German Chancellor) about this?” (Más, 2015, *text in parentheses added for clarification*). Romeva and Más are correct in stating there is no explicit *legal* prohibition of “internal enlargement”, but this should not ammount to an endorsement of “internal enlargement”.

The host remains unconvinced by this claim, insisting that constitutional scholarship is against what Mr. Romeva was arguing, so Romeva switches tack and begins to talk about the political consequences of a Catalan unilateral declaration of independence:

“Romeva: The European Union is a very pragmatic project. And I’ve seen, *thousands of times* that a situation that seems to be a problem, an unsolvable problem, then, you suddenly *get up* and find a solution”

(Romeva, 2015, 12:48 – 12:59, *emphasis in original*)

“Romeva: They know that keeping the Catalonia out of the European Union and out of the Eurozone – it’s a problem for them too”

(Romeva, 2015, 14:53 – 14:59)

As the interview draws to a close, what is most striking about the exchange are the similarities with the Jenkins interview. Both politicians began by talking about the law and ended talking about politics (BBC Scotland, 2013; Romeva, 2015). While this may be a reflection of the weakness of their legal arguments, it may also reflect the political uncertainty that would be unleashed should either region decide to secede its host state.

Problematic: “Internal enlargement” will be easy

One of the arguments that we have seen proponents of “internal enlargement” make in the last two sections is that such a political manoeuvre would *not* face any resistance by the rest of the Member States. Once a Catalan or a Scottish *demos* voted for secession, the Member States of the European Union would act as rational utility maximisers, allowing the new nation to negotiate its new “terms and conditions” from within (BBC Scotland, 2013; Romeva, 2015). This kind of reasoning, which is conceptually connected to the linking of “internal enlargement” with the Enlightenment, is surprisingly reminiscent of many arguments that we have heard from prominent Brexiteers. For example, in January 2017, former UKIP leader Paul Nuttall reminded listeners of the following:

“It will be easy to negotiate a trade deal (with the European Union), and of course, it’s in the European Union’s interest, just as it is in ours”

(Nuttall, 2017, cited in Barnes, 2017, para. 5, *text in parentheses added for clarification*)

A few months later, international trade secretary Liam Fox stated the following on the “Britain Today” programme:

“The free trade agreement that we will have to do with the European Union should be one of the easiest in human history...The only reason that we wouldn’t come to a free and open agreement is because politics gets in the way of economics”

(Fox, 2017, cited in Weaver, 2017, paras. 2 - 4)

That politics often gets in the way of economics is a well – known fact to students of international relations. Governments have only recently (the post – war era) begun to see free trade as desirable (O'Brien & Williams, 2016), and there is every sign that we are in the process of reverting to a mercantilist way of conducting world politics. But more importantly, as Alexander Wendt (1992) argued in his seminal article, what may seem like *rational* behavior for one (emerging) state may not seem like rational behavior for another. This is because the national interest of a state, far from arising from exogenous situations, is grounded in the unique *identity* of each state, which is endogenous (Wendt, 1992). As a result, different states will react very differently to the situations that arise in international relations, even if they have similar national identities. Witness the Trump White House leaving the Iran Nuclear Deal as liberal, capitalist allies such as Germany or France fight so desperately to preserve it in the same year.

While the Brexiter assumed that the European Union would act in economic self – interest once the dust of the Brexit debate had settled, the reality is that the EU sees other potential “defections” from the Union (via Art. 50) as an existential threat, and so far seems willing to absorb considerable economic pain (a “No Deal” scenario) if this will prevent other countries from leaving its bloc. Due to the similar arguments, but also due to the “leap – in – the – dark” approach that both Brexiter and proponents of “internal enlargement” have advocated, the idea that an “internal enlargement” will be easy presupposes a common rationality for all political actors and this is something problematic.

Chapter Nine: Alex Salmond addresses business leaders in Aberdeen, 2014

Context

On the 17th of February, 2014, 7 months from the date of the Scottish referendum, Alex Salmond addressed business leaders in the city of Aberdeen. While Salmond devotes most of his speech to making the case as to why a currency union with Britain would be feasible, post – independence, I have selected this speech because he also addresses some of the contentions regarding a potentially independent Scotland in the EU. As usual, Salmond’s opinions on “internal enlargement” are authoritative due to his position at the top of the Scottish Government at the time (Owen, 2014).

Statements on “internal enlargement”

Salmond first broaches the topic of “internal enlargement” approximately eight minutes into his speech, by countering an argument made by former EU Commissioner Barroso against “internal enlargement” the previous day:

“In the event of a ‘Yes’ vote, the campaigning will stop and the common-sense agreements will start”

(Salmond, 2014, 7:55 – 8:02, *emphasis in original*)

“And I would submit that the same democratic logic applies to the comments of Mr. Barroso yesterday”

(Salmond, 2014, 8:08 – 8:13, *emphasis in original*)

Barroso had appeared on the Andrew Marr show (UK) and argued that it would be “difficult, if not impossible” (Syal, 2014, para. 1) for an independent Scotland to join the EU. This view is consistent with the authoritative legal argument of the Commission that a state emerging from an existing Member State would have to apply for EU membership via Art. 49 TEU, requiring consensus of all Member States:

“We've seen that Spain has been opposing even the recognition of Kosovo, for instance, so it's to some extent a similar case because it's a new country and so I believe it's going to be extremely difficult, if not impossible, a new member state coming out of one of our countries getting the agreement of the other [existing member states].”

(Barroso, 2014, cited in Syal, 2014, para. 6)

Like Jenkins and Romeva, Salmond appears to be using a *topos* of rationality in his rhetoric. The *endoxa*, or common-sense argument, would appear be the following: *when faced with an existential challenge, all parties involved must act rationally* (i.e. in a utility – maximising manner). The EU, personified by Barroso, is represented in Salmond’s speech as an inherently political actor (*predication*) and therefore untrustworthy when it comes to claims of truth and normative rightness (*arguments*). It is interesting to note that Salmond conceptualizes politics in his speech as having distinct phases, each one governed by a different logic. There is a pre – campaign stage for planning, a campaign stage for politicking and a post – campaign stage for acting in a professional and restrained manner.

Like Jenkins, Salmond cites the opinion of distinguished lawyers – in this case, Sir David Edward and Graham Avery, a distinguished scholar of European law – when speaking of the legal status of Scotland, post – independence:

“As Sir David Edward, formerly from the European Court of Justice has pointed out, from the point of a “Yes” vote, *what is certain* is that EU law would require all parties to negotiate in good faith and in a spirit of cooperation”

(Salmond, 2014, 8:15 – 8:29, *emphasis in original*)

“Or as Graham Avery, the honorary Director – General of the EU Commission, has argued, in front of the Scottish Parliament, a European Union which had admitted so many countries from all points of the European compass will find a pragmatic way to accommodate the expression of democratic will from the people of Scotland”

(Salmond, 2014, 8:30 – 8:50)

Salmond also cites the opinion of James Crawford, the expert on international law that was consulted by Westminster, in support of his point (Salmond, 2014). In mentioning

these three figures, Salmond is making an argument (*argumentation*) regarding how we should view the resolution of “internal enlargement”, that could be expressed in the following syllogism:

Syllogism 1 (Salmond)

Premise One: Scotland’s membership of the EU will be determined according to the law

Premise Two: Highly regarded experts of the law claim it is possible for Scotland to remain a member of the EU

Conclusion: Therefore, Scotland will remain a member of the EU

Salmond could also be using a *topos* of expertise or authority, with the *endoxa* being: *if one is uncertain of the outcome of a particular action, one should first consult the experts on said action.*

However, his argument is fallacious, and Salmond contradicts himself in the next breath by claiming (*argumentation*) that “internal enlargement” of the EU is ultimately a political matter:

“Now, the decision is one for member states. But not to recognise the democratic will of Scotland would run counter to the entire European Union ideal of democratic expression and inclusion. It would pose a challenge to the integrity of the European Union *even* greater and more fundamental than the threat of British withdrawal”

(Salmond, 2014, 9:23 – 9:42)

“That is why, of course, no Member State suggested it would seek to block Scottish membership”

In other words: the opinion of the experts ultimately doesn't make a difference in this matter; this issue will be settled by numbers alone. This is a repetition of the common nationalist mantra that we have seen before (BBC Scotland, 2013) (Romeva, 2015) (Mandojana, 2016). However, in this fragment of his speech Salmond makes his most powerful argument in favour of “internal enlargement”. The European Union is about *democratic expression* and *inclusion*; if Scotland, a member of that European *demos*, makes a democratic decision, it should be respected and accommodated because it coheres with the EU's most fundamental values. Implicitly, Salmond would seem to be grounding his argument on a vision of the EU as a “Europe of the Citizens” (*nomination* in the DHA).

Ending with that comment about Member States and Scottish membership, Salmond devotes the rest of his speech to making a case for a sterling currency union.

Problematic: “Internal enlargement” and democracy

This is perhaps the most important area of “internal enlargement” to problematize, so I will include a quick re – capitulation of what we are problematizing in the first place. “Internal enlargement” is the *political* proposal that EU regions should be allowed to secede from their host state *and* continue to benefit from the EU Treaties (primarily through access to the Single Market) while re – applying for EU membership (Chapter Two). The motivation for “internal enlargement” is primarily *developmental* (Hopkin, 2016), and an EU endorsement of an “internal enlargement”, if only tacit, could represent a turning point in European international relations, paving the way for the appearance of a host of new European states (Chapter Two).

If one considers democratic governance to be important, it is essential that one should discuss such a potentially transformative event in terms of democracy. I note that nationalists in Catalonia and Scotland speak very highly of the “democratic nature” of the European Union (Puigdemont, 2017; Sturgeon, 2017; Torrà, 2018a; Torrà, 2018b), and sometimes have referred to Art. 2 TEU as evidence that the Union is intrinsically democratic (Edward, 2012; Kenealy, 2014). Art. 2 TEU reads:

“The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.”

(TEU, 1992, cited in EUR-lex, 2012a)

I also note that European regionalists hold democracy (in general) in high – regard: it was the liberalization of politics, after all, that allowed parties such as *Convergència i Unió* or the SNP to win elections and pursue national self – determination (Balcells, 1996; Devine, 2012; Torrance, 2013; Bel, 2015; Cotarelo, 2018). The politics of nationalists in Catalonia and Scotland have been credited with de – creasing levels of democratic disaffection in those regions (Cramer, 2015; Hassan & Barrow, 2017). “How many little children, six – or seven – year olds, know who the president of their country is?” asked an elated Catalan comedian, echoing the thoughts of many “This is amazing” (Albà, 2018, cited in Brunat, 2018, para. 4). “What do we do with all (this) joyful commitment” asked a *Guardian* columnist in 2014, thinking along similar lines “with the biggest surge of creative democratic energy that Scotland has ever seen?” (Ascherson, 2014, para. 18).

However, it is important to remember that democracy is an *essentially contested concept* (Norris, 2013) and that there are exist very different understandings of what democracy entails. What “Euro – nationalists” are proposing is that a part of their *demos* (the “Catalan people” in Spain and the “Scottish people” in Britain) should separate itself from the rest of the *demos* if said separation is backed by a majority of the aforementioned part. While the practical implications of this proposal in Catalonia and Scotland are as of yet unclear, the idea that a part of a *demos* can choose to break up from the whole is controversial in its own right and (in the absence of human rights violations) considered un – democratic by some:

“Why should one assume that the mere fact of residence in an area authorizes persons to decide by majority vote not only to change their own citizenship but also to deprive others (the nonsecessionists) of their citizenship?”

(Buchanan, 2017, para. 30)

We saw in the Romeva interview how it is possible to conflate the exercise of democracy with the pursuit of national self – determination (Romeva, 2015). *Democracy* in itself does not demand that every national group pursue formal statehood, because the right to self – determination can be exercised comfortably from *within* a democratic state (Buchanan, 2017), with regions such as Québec in Canada or Bavaria in Germany being a case in point.

More importantly, the European Union may possess impressive normative credentials (Kenealy, 2014), but it certainly should not be considered democratic in the ordinary sense of the word (Hewitson & D'Auria, 2012; DiEM25, 2018). Most of its institutions of government are unelected, and ordinary Europeans have little say in the politically motivated policies of a Central Bank which left the EU Member States of the Mediterranean to shoulder the burden of the sovereign debt crisis while their Northern neighbors prospered (DiEM25, 2018). We should be clear that the (democratic) energy currently being expended in certain EU regions is being expended on behalf of the creation of new states and not, as some politicians have claimed, on behalf of democracy (Romeva, 2015).

Chapter Ten: Conclusion

This dissertation concludes having answered the two guiding questions posed at the end of the introduction. We *can* indeed say that the *Generalitat* and the Scottish Government have been acting as “normative entrepreneurs”, on the basis that their political proposals for an “internal enlargement” of the European Union would have far – reaching normative effects if put into practice. As to the question of what aspects of their “political norm” can be regarded as problematic, I have identified the following five areas:

- Suggestions that Catalonia or Scotland are entitled to become EU Member States based on their European history, echoed if not stated explicitly in Puigdemont’s (2017) speech.
- The incompatibility of the grievance – based nationalism espoused by Puigdemont (2017) and Sturgeon (2017) with the ideals of the European Union.
- The problematic associations of an “internal enlargement” with the Enlightenment made by Jenkins (2013) and Romeva (2015).
- The suggestion by Jenkins (2013) and Romeva (2015) that an “internal enlargement” would be easy.
- And finally, the problematic association that Salmond (2014) and others have made between an “internal enlargement” of the EU and democracy.

This list is not intended to be an exhaustive treatment of all the areas of “internal enlargement” that could be considered problematic. Neither was it the intention of this dissertation to discredit or disqualify proponents of secession from Britain or Spain. Particularly in Spain, where concerns remain as to whether the Spanish state has rejected the ways of dictator Francisco Franco entirely (Amnesty International, 2017; Cotarelo, 2018), many Catalans can make a convincing case that they should be allowed to secede.

However, I am sceptical of the idea of “internal enlargement” of “independence – in – Europe” on normative grounds. The right to self – determination can be exercised within a democratic state (Buchanan, 2017), and there is both willingness and the ability to re – dress the wrongs that these regions have suffered (Torrance, 2013; Sanz, 2018) within their current institutional settings. More importantly, making formal statehood more attractive to the multiplicity of EU regions that would seek it will do little to address the institutional shortcomings of the Union (Lewis, 2013) or the economic, social, political and ecological crises which it currently faces (DiEM25, 2018).

For this reason, I have sought a critique of “internal enlargement” through the de – construction of the discourse of powerful politicians on “internal enlargement”, showing that their understanding of European integration features a series of fallacies, contradictions, conflation and mis – representations which could be reproduced should the potentiality described in Chapter Two ever come to pass. To answer the re – formulated Weiler question: the political self that would be born from an “internal enlargement” would be a fundamentally self – centered one (Weiler, 2012, pg. 911), a figure at odds with an organisation working toward the “political, economic and monetary union” between its Member States (European Commission, 2016, para. 5)

As a side benefit, I have arrived upon data on some of the discursive strategies that the five political leaders used to advocate for “internal enlargement” within the framework of the Discourse Historical Approach. While not a complete typology, this list may serve to inform a more complete study in the future:

Table 4: Overview of featured discursive strategies

Discursive Strategy	Application in proposals of “internal enlargement”
Nomination	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Discursive construction “Catalan” and “Scottish” peoples as distinct from “Spanish” or “British” ones (Puigdemont, 2017; Sturgeon, 2017) • Discursive construction of “Brexit” as an English phenomenon (Sturgeon, 2017).
Predication	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • British and Spanish states intransigent; Spanish state repressive (Puigdemont, 2017; Sturgeon, 2017). • Assumption of a common rationality across EU Member States (Jenkins, 2013; Romeva, 2015).
Argumentation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Secession justified because central state has neglected region (Romeva, 2015; Puigdemont, 2017; Sturgeon, 2017). • “Brexit” is an English imposition on Scotland (Sturgeon, 2017). • “Internal enlargement” will not be a legal decision (Jenkins, 2013; Salmond, 2014; Romeva, 2015). • Once secession takes place, Member States will act in Enlightened self – interest (Jenkins, 2013; Salmond, 2014; Romeva, 2015).

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Negative legal argument (Romeva, 2015).
Perspectivization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The struggle for “internal enlargement” is fundamentally about <i>democracy</i> (Salmond, 2014; Romeva, 2015)
Intensification/ Mitigation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Stress placed on <i>exceptional</i> neglect of region by central state which has led us to this situation (Puigdemont, 2017; Sturgeon, 2017)

Is there a better alternative to a “Europe of the Regions”?

Yes. A Europe that is post – national is considered by many to be highly desirable (DiEM25, 2018). The existence of a self – contained “peoples” is both historically contentious and subjective, in that a “peoples” is ultimately grounded in inter – subjectively held beliefs and not, as some nationalists suggest, in nature (Hobsbawm, 1993; Anderson, 2006; Cotarelo). In addition to this, national ego – centrism has – historically – been the main antagonist to European integration (Hewitson & D'Auria, 2012; Phinnemore, 2013; Urwin, 2013), and the stage is set for this trend to continue. Witness how reaching a deal that addresses the plight of refugees on the EU’s southern border has proven nigh impossible for EU Member States this summer (Al Jazeera, 2018; Balmer, et al., 2018; Cendrowicz, 2016).

The creation of a European *demos* and of truly representative European institutions could go a long way in both safe – guarding the gains of European integration and allowing us to address the existential, trans – national crises we face, such as climate change or the migrant crisis, in a more effective way (DiEM25, 2018). Habermas’ proposal for the creation of a European contstitution would, if adopted, constitute a powerful step toward this goal

(Habermas, 2001). According to Habermas, a European constitution could, potentially, act as a catalyst for the creation of the United States of Europe:

“Once the European Union gained financial autonomy, the Commission assumed the functions of a government and the Council became something like a second chamber...the focus on politics would move to some extent from national capitals to the European centre. The perceived trans – national overlap of parallel interests would give rise to...a properly European party system”

(Habermas, 2001, pg. 11)

This would leave the European public in a qualitatively better place than it is today, at the mercy of institutions derived from an incomplete process of European integration. Making the European Central Bank accountable to European voters could ensure that the burden of the next financial crisis is not shared differentially across Member States. An intensification of cross – border connections in the life of everyday Europeans could generate greater solidarity with other “peoples” and a greater willingness to reach agreements on difficult issues such as climate change and migration, in addition to the willingness to shoulder difficult burdens. And a greater sense of internal unity in the EU could contribute greatly to its clout on the world stage, which would in turn strengthen its ability to deliver on the issues that matter for Europeans. There is an ample base of values (respect for the environment, post – modernism, non – interventionism) upon which a common European foreign policy could be constructed (Habermas, 2001).

This highly desirable change cannot take place so long as our focus is on the creation of national borders and boundaries between Europeans, which is the main concern of opportunistic “Euro – nationalist” politicians. But they, too, can work toward this goal if they

decide to capitalize on the democratic impetus they have created in their regions and re – orient it toward something greater than themselves.

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